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 INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 
The National Association for Public Defense 
(“NAPD”) is an association of more than 14,000 
attorneys, investigators, social workers, 
administrators, and other professionals who fulfill 
constitutional mandates to deliver public defense 
representation throughout all U.S. states and 
territories. NAPD members advocate for clients in 
jails, courtrooms, and communities, and are experts 
in the theory and practice of effective defense to 
people who are charged with crimes but who cannot 
afford to hire counsel. They work in federal, state, 
county, and municipal jurisdictions as full-time, 
contract, and assigned counsel, litigating juvenile, 
capital, and appellate cases through a diversity of 
traditional and holistic practice models. 
NAPD plays an important role in advocating for 
defense counsel and the clients they serve, and is 
uniquely situated to speak to issues of fairness and 
justice in criminal legal systems. The critical 
importance of the jury’s role in checking government 
power has only increased in the context of 
contemporary mass incarceration—a phenomenon 
widely criticized by sentencing experts. See, e.g., 
Vivien Stern, The International Impact of U.S. 
                                            
1 No counsel for a party authored this amicus curiae brief in 
whole or in part, and no such counsel or party made a monetary 
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of 
this brief. By letters dated October 27, 2016, amicus notified 
counsel of record for both parties in this case of the intent to file 
this amicus brief, and both parties have consented to the filing 
of this brief. 
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Policies, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENTS 279–80 (Marc 
Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind, eds. 2002). Members of 
the federal judiciary—including a Member of this 
Court—have acknowledged resulting harms. 
Associated Press, Justice Criticizes Lengthy Sentences, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2003, 
www.nytimes.com/2003/08/10/us/justice-criticizes-
lengthy-sentences.html (“Our resources are misspent, 
our punishments too severe, our sentences too 
long … .”) (quoting Justice Kennedy’s address to the 
2003 annual meeting of the American Bar 
Association). 
The effects of mass incarceration fall 
disproportionately on low-income communities and 
communities of color, and those effects include the 
deepening of a democracy deficit in which these 
communities exercise relatively little voice in 
generating and administering the governing law. J. 
TRAVIS, ET AL., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE 
GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 
EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 303 (2014). In 
light of these factors, a robust right to jury trial has 
heightened importance as a critical bulwark against 
the exercise of concentrated government power and 
its disproportionate effects in already disadvantaged 
communities. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE 
OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 141–42 (2011). As 
this case presents important and unresolved 
questions about the jury’s role and the protections the 
jury offers to the rights of individual criminal 
defendants as well as to society at large, NAPD 
respectfully offers its perspective to the Court.  
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The jury is essential to our structure of 
government, available to criminal defendants as the 
final arbiter of guilt. As this Court has recognized 
time and again, the jury serves an important role 
both structurally within the balance of powers and as 
a check on governmental power, adding a layer of 
protection for individual defendants. 
The rule applied by the Ninth Circuit and some 
other courts, allowing dismissal of a holdout juror if a 
judge sees no reasonable possibility that his view is 
connected to the merits of the case, threatens the 
fundamental role of the jury. In contrast to the rule 
endorsed by federal courts of appeals that prohibit 
dismissal if there is any possibility a juror’s view is 
connected to the merits, the Ninth Circuit’s rule 
makes dismissal of jurors easier, resulting in more 
frequent removal of dissenting viewpoints. Equally 
threatening to the jury is the practical reality of the 
Ninth Circuit’s approach, which forces judges to 
invade jury deliberations in order to assess the 
reasonableness of a juror’s views. 
The rule applied below risks minimizing the role 
of the jury in the criminal system and forces judges to 
undertake intrusive assessments of the 
reasonableness of individual juror’s views. This Court 
should grant certiorari and clarify the standard 
under which a dissenting juror can be investigated 
and ultimately dismissed. 
- 4 - 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Role of the Jury Is Fundamental in Our 
National Justice System. 
The jury performs a role essential to the balance 
of powers and protection of individual rights in our 
system of government. The jury right has long been 
recognized as a key guarantor of protection against 
government overreach, a systematic and structural 
defense for the individual. “This right was designed 
to guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on 
the part of rulers, and was from very early times 
insisted on by our ancestors in the parent country, as 
the great bulwark of their civil and political liberties.” 
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1995) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
This Court has recognized the essential role the 
jury plays in the functioning of the federal 
constitutional system: The jury trial right “is no mere 
procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation 
of power in our constitutional structure. Just as 
suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate control in the 
legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant 
to ensure their control in the judiciary.” Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305–06 (2004) (citation 
omitted). 
As this Court has observed, the history of the 
right shows the Founders’ concern about protecting a 
criminal defendant against potentially arbitrary 
judicial action: 
A right to jury trial is granted to criminal 
defendants in order to prevent oppression by 
the Government. Those who wrote our 
constitutions knew from history and 
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experience that it was necessary to protect 
against unfounded criminal charges brought to 
eliminate enemies and against judges too 
responsive to the voice of higher authority. 
The framers of the constitutions strove to 
create an independent judiciary but insisted 
upon further protection against arbitrary 
action. Providing an accused with the right to 
be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an 
inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or 
overzealous prosecutor and against the 
compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. If the 
defendant preferred the common-sense 
judgment of a jury to the more tutored but 
perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single 
judge, he was to have it. Beyond this, the jury 
trial provisions in the Federal and State 
Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision 
about the exercise of official power—a 
reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the 
life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to 
a group of judges. Fear of unchecked power, so 
typical of our State and Federal Governments 
in other respects, found expression in the 
criminal law in this insistence upon 
community participation in the determination 
of guilt or innocence.  
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155–56 (1968). 
The importance of the jury right, coupled with the 
unanimity requirement in the federal system and the 
vast majority of states, makes each jury member’s 
perspective relevant and each and every juror of 
equal importance in the outcome. “The dynamics of 
the jury process are such that often only one or two 
- 6 - 
members express doubt as to view held by a majority 
at the outset of deliberations. A rule which insists on 
unanimity furthers the deliberative process by 
requiring the minority view to be examined and, if 
possible, accepted or rejected by the entire jury.” 
United States v. Lopez, 581 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 
1978) (Kennedy, J.). 
B. The Decision Below Undermines the 
Functioning of the Essential Institution of 
the Jury. 
Any rule of law that threatens the jury’s role by 
minimizing or demanding justification from 
dissenting viewpoints demands scrutiny and should 
require strong justification. The rule applied by 
courts that allow dismissal of a dissenting juror 
absent a “reasonable possibility” that his view is 
connected to the merits of the case encourages 
interference with the jury’s role and weakens the 
jury’s status as a safeguard for criminal defendants, 
with no corresponding benefit. 
1. The Holdout Juror Serves an 
Important Role for the Legitimacy 
and Reliability of the Jury System. 
The dissenting juror serves as an important check 
preserving the rights of a criminal defendant, 
especially in the federal system and the many state 
systems where a jury must be unanimous. The juror 
who dissents even in the face of the social pressure of 
a jury panel that is otherwise in agreement offers a 
different viewpoint that adds to both the quality of 
the deliberation that culminates in the ultimate 
verdict and, studies suggest, the accuracy of the 
- 7 - 
verdict itself. This important role thus safeguards not 
only the individual criminal defendant’s rights, but 
the jury system and its place in society as well. 
In the unanimous jury system, the vote of each 
juror is determinative, and thus even one juror can 
exercise the role envisioned by the Framers, serving 
as a check on overzealous prosecution or insufficient 
evidence. Nor is there any reason to think that the 
holdout juror must necessarily be eccentric, incorrect, 
or unthinking. A holdout juror must maintain his 
view in the face of unanimous disagreement from the 
rest of the panel, often over a significant length of 
time. Indeed, one study concluded that the views of 
holdouts are far from eccentric; the trial judge often 
sided with dissenting jurors in non-unanimous 
verdicts. Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose, & 
Beth Murphy, Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement: 
The Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 
NW. U. L. REV. 201, 221–22 (2006).   
A juror who takes a different view from the 
majority of the panel strengthens the deliberative 
process that results in the jury’s ultimate verdict. As 
one study found, jurors “report[ed] more thorough 
and open-minded debate” when forced to reach 
unanimity and thus interact with any dissenting 
jurors. Diamond, Rose & Murphy, supra, at 230. As 
this Court long ago observed, “[t]he very object of the 
jury system is to secure unanimity by a comparison of 
views, and by arguments among the jurors 
themselves.” Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 
(1896). Where a holdout juror remains in 
deliberations, the jury is forced to confront the 
opposing viewpoint, resulting in a jury verdict that is 
reached after taking account of diverse views. A rule 
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like the one below, which permits a jury to more 
easily conscript a judge into removing a juror who 
sees the case differently, allows juries to avoid this 
thorough deliberation. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, 
Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
1261, 1263–64 (2000) (“Jury research conducted in 
the past two decades reveals that eliminating the 
obligation to secure each person’s agreement on the 
verdict can result in truncating or even eliminating 
jury deliberations.”). This, in turn, risks removing the 
holdout juror’s ability to contribute to the function 
the jury performs in the governmental system. In 
Oregon, for instance, where non-unanimous verdicts 
are allowed, 65.5% of verdicts on at least one count in 
felony jury trials were non-unanimous, 
demonstrating that juries who can ignore an opposing 
viewpoint will regularly do so. See OREGON OFFICE OF 
PUBLIC DEFENSE SERVICE APPELLATE DIVISION, ON 
THE FREQUENCY OF NON-UNANIMOUS FELONY 
VERDICTS IN OREGON 4 (2009). By allowing minority 
viewpoints to be silenced, a rule making dismissal of 
a dissenting juror easier allows juries to target those 
whose backgrounds or experiences may be different 
from their own, and to attempt to remove those voices 
from the deliberative process. Conversely, where a 
jury is forced to reach a unanimous verdict, it “has a 
precise effect on the fact-finding process, one which 
gives particular significance and conclusiveness to 
the jury’s verdict. Both the defendant and society can 
place special confidence in a unanimous verdict … .” 
Lopez, 581 F.2d at 1341.  
Jurors express greater confidence in the accuracy 
of their verdicts where all members agree. See 
Diamond, Rose & Murphy, supra, at 208. A survey of 
wrongful convictions in Louisiana, where some non-
- 9 - 
unanimous criminal verdicts are permitted, found 
that out of 20 wrongful convictions where the verdict 
could be non-unanimous, 9 were the result of verdicts 
reached over dissenting votes. See Br. of Innocence 
Project New Orleans as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 11, Jackson v. Louisiana, No. 13-1105 
(U.S. 2014). 
2. Unlike the Rule in Some Courts, the 
“Reasonableness” Standard Applied 
by the Ninth Circuit and Others 
Forces Judges To Intrude into the 
Province of the Jury. 
The rule allowing dismissal of a juror where there 
is “no reasonable possibility” that his view relates to 
the merits of the case requires greater intrusion into 
the jury’s role by the district judge, who must 
examine the reasons for the complaints about the 
holdout and inquire into the holdout’s reasoning. 
Because of the jury’s important role as a check within 
the criminal justice system, any rule encouraging this 
increased intrusion on the jury role should be met 
with skepticism. 
Holdout jurors already face significant pressure 
to conform to the views of the majority. See Dan 
Simon, More Problems with Criminal Trials: The 
Limited Effectiveness of Legal Mechanisms, 75 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 198–99 (2012) (surveying 
empirical data demonstrating that “a distinctive 
feature of jury deliberation is that unanimity is often 
achieved through social pressure,” and that the 
“strength of the social pressure tends to increase as 
the deliberation progresses”). Such pressure can only 
be magnified when it is a judge who inquires into the 
rationale of the views of the holdout juror, and the 
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“no reasonable possibility” rule increases both the 
frequency and intensity of this inquiry. The 
difference between the standard allowing dismissal of 
a juror where there is “no reasonable possibility” that 
the view is connected to the merits, as compared to 
the bar on dismissal where there is “any possibility” 
that the view is connected to the merits, has a 
practical effect on the judge/jury relationship. 
First, the “no reasonable possibility” rule 
increases the likelihood of an inquiry into a 
dissenting juror’s views. Jurors in the majority can, 
as they did in this case, more easily appeal to the 
district judge about their disagreement. The “no 
reasonable possibility” rule, designed as it is to make 
juror dismissal more attainable, will lead to more 
frequent inquiries by the judge, since a wider variety 
of opinions and behavior by holdout jurors will 
demand an inquiry into the reasonableness of a 
holdout’s views and their connection to the merits. 
Regardless of how the judge constructs the inquiry or 
whether he dismisses the juror, the “no reasonable 
possibility” rule will result in judges more often 
needing to make an inquiry in the first place. Thus, 
whether the holdout is dismissed or not, the very fact 
of the questioning by the district judge, which will be 
more frequent under the reasonableness rule, 
intrudes into substantive jury deliberations by 
sending (even if inadvertently) a powerful signal to 
both the holdout and the other jurors about what the 
result ought to be. Indeed, here, the jury decided to 
convict shortly after the alternate juror was seated. 
See Pet. 16. 
Second, the reasonableness inquiry requires a 
more substantive, and thus more intrusive, 
- 11 - 
exploration of the holdout’s reasoning by the district 
judge. The judge must gather enough information to 
assess whether the juror’s expressed opinions have no 
reasonable possibility of relation to the merits. Here, 
for instance, the standard required inquiry into the 
juror’s views even after the district court 
acknowledged that the juror’s reported statements 
could be construed as comments on the strength of 
the government’s case. As the dissenting judge below 
(himself a federal district court judge) noted, “the 
record makes clear that the questioned jurors’ 
answers to the court’s inquiries were rooted, at least 
potentially, in their disagreement with Juror 7 about 
his assessment of the merits of the government’s 
case.” Pet. App. 133a (Christensen, C.J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). Juror 7 had 
commented, for instance, on the fact that a key 
witness was missing from the government’s case, Pet. 
App. 91a, and that it was a “joke case,” and later 
confirmed that he thought the evidence insufficient 
because it was circumstantial, Pet. App. 93a n.24. In 
circuits that apply the “any possibility” rule, no 
inquiry would have been needed: As even the district 
judge here concluded, there was some possibility that 
the holdout juror’s views of the case were connected 
to the merits. Under the approach adopted by other 
courts of appeals, that fact would have prohibited the 
inquiry. Instead, as this case demonstrates, under the 
“no reasonable possibility” standard, the judge is 
forced into complicated interactions with jurors that 
would not take place under the rule from other 
courts. And that inquiry will continually risk 
intrusion into substantive deliberations. The record 
from the district court shows that the judge 
“repeatedly had to cut [jurors] off mid-sentence” 
- 12 - 
because the inquiry inevitably led jurors to discuss 
the merits of jury deliberations. See Pet. App. 96a. 
Thus, the “no reasonable possibility” rule has 
systemic consequences, forcing judges into intrusive 
questioning that interferes in the jury’s functioning, 
no matter how careful the judge is. Indeed, several 
members of this Court have expressed deep unease 
about a trial judge intruding into the jury’s sphere to 
dismiss a holdout juror. “[T]he possibility of getting 
rid of … the hold-out juror,” rather than encouraging 
further deliberation, “is really troublesome.” Tr. at 
18, Johnson v. Williams, No. 11-465, 133 S. Ct. 1088 
(2013) (statement of Ginsburg, J.); see also id. at 21 
(statement of Sotomayor, J.) (“I’m deeply troubled 
when trial judges intrude in the deliberative 
processes of juries.”); id. at 19 (statement of 
Kennedy, J.) (“agree[ing]” that such intrusion is “very 
troublesome”). 
Holdout jurors play an essential role in promoting 
careful deliberation and ensuring that the jury 
performs its protective function of bringing the voices 
of individuals into the criminal justice system. And 
they provide this safeguard at little risk to the 
efficiency of the system: the rate of hung juries in 
federal criminal trials is quite low. See PAULA L. 
HANNAFORD-AGOR, VALERIE P. HANS, NICOLE L. MOTT 
& G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN, NATIONAL CENTER FOR 
STATE COURTS, ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM 22 
(2002). Thus, there is no danger of rampant hung 
juries if holdouts are not more easily removable. The 
rule applied below, making removal of holdout jurors 
easier, is a solution in search of a problem. Instead, 
holdout jurors should be permitted to offer their 
unique perspective in the jury system where there is 
- 13 - 
any possibility that their dissenting view relates to 
the merits of the case. 
CONCLUSION 
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be 
granted. 
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